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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

CACHE COUNTY DRAINAGE DISTRICT No. 5, a quasi corporation of the
State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent.
vs.
W. R. WESTOVER and MYRTHA
WESTOVER, his wife; ALLEN G.
WHEELER
and
DELORES
G. \
WHEELER, his wife; SOI CHI I'1VOMOTO and JANE DOE IWOMOTO;
his wife; MI CHI IWOMOTO and
JANE DOE l\VOMOTO, his wife; and
IRIEL IWOMOTO and .JANE DOE
lWOMOTO, his wife,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case
No.
12151

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is a civil action in two counts brought by Respondent, first to recover annual drainage assessments
from the time of creation of the Respondent to the
time this suit was commenced on the property of Appellants which is located within the boundaries of Respondent's drainage district, and second to establish a right
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of way by prescriptive use m a drainage ditch across
the property of Appellants.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the Court without jury, the
Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen presiding. At the outset of the trial, the Appellants moved for an order dismissing Respondent's First Count. The motion was not
resisted and was taken under advisement by the Court.
No evidence was presented by Respondent on its first
count, and on November 5, 1969 the Court entered its
written Order Dismissing Respondent's First Count.
On Respondent's Second Count, the Court found that
Respondent had used the drain in question across Appellants' property for a period in excess of twenty ( 20)
years; that such use had been made each and every year
and that such use by Respondent was adverse to the
Appellants. Based upon this finding, the Court entered
Judgment for theRespondent and against the Appellants
on Respondent's Second Count and decreed that Respondent had a right of way in the drain across Appellants' property acquired by prescriptive use. Appellants moved the Court, within the time provided by
law, for a new trial or, in the alternative, for an amendment of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of l-1aw
and for entry of a new .J udg-ment, which motions were
denied.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek to have the judgment of the trial
court on Respondent's Second Count reversed and judgment entered that Respondent failed to prove its claim
to a right of way by prescription or, in the alternative,
that this Court order a new trial.
S'J1ATEMENT OF FACTS
The Respondent is and at all times pertinent to these
proceedings was a quasi corporation of the State of
Ptah. (R. 1, par. 1 and R. 17, par. 1) The Appellants
are the owners of the Northeast Quarter of Section 12,
Township 14 North, Range 1 "\Vest of the Salt Lake Meridian, and this quarter section lies within the boundaries
of Cache County Drainage District No. 5. (R. 1 par. 2,
R. 2 par. 3, and R. 17 par. 1) Said quarter section is
bounded on the north by a State Road. (Pl. Ex. 16)
The Bear River runs in a generally north-south direction
approximately one mile west of said quarter section.
The property to the north and east of said Quarter
Section is within the boundaries of Cache Drainage
District No. 5.
One Owen Rawlins owns land to the west of said
quarter section, and in 194;) he constructed a drain
commencing on the brow of the east gorge of the Bear
River and extending eastward about one-half way
through his land. ('f. 87 1n. 30, T. 88 and 89) One Doug-
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las .A. Bergeson owns land adjoining that of Rawlins
on the east, and when he observed the drain being constructed by Rawlins, he went to Rawlins and made
arrangements to extend the drain on into his property.
(T. 89

90) Thereafter, the drain was extended on
Bergeson's property to the property adjoining
Bergeson to the east and then northerly across the property now owned by Appellants. (T. 90 lns. 6 to 30)
The drain in question is depicted by the red line on Respondent's EJxhibits 15 and 16.
The cost of this drain
defrayed by the property
owners across whose land it was constructed and by
whose land it benefited on an acreage basis and cost
approximately $5,200.00. (T. 114) The group involved
in the drain called themselves the Third \Vard Drainage Company. (T. 92 lns 2-6) The drain constructed by
the Third Ward Drainage Company was for the use
and benefit ,of the land assessed for its construction
and has been used by the owners of such land for drainage purposes each .year since constructed. ( rr. 92 Ins.
22 729) Construction of the drain was completed in 1946
and when completed did not extend onto the State Road
right
way. (T. 116 Ins 1-3)
At the time of its completion, not all the property
O\Vners had paid their assessments for the cost of the
drain, and thPc construction company which dug the drain
was pressing for its money. To satisfy the demands of

the construction company, Douglas A. Bergeson paid
the bill for digging the drain from his own funds. (T.
116 Ins 6-15)

In an effort to recoup the money he had paid in,
Bergeson then went to the State of Utah which paid
him $500.00 in consideration of his agreement to extend
the drain on to the borrow pit of the State Road and
to take the amount of waste and drainage water which
originated on the State right of way out through the
drain. ( rr. 117 Ins 1-17)
Prior to construction of the drain in question, the water draining off the land of Respondent had run down the
borrow pit of the State Road on the north of Appellants' land directly west into the Beal" River. (T. 41 ins.
4-16) Thereafter, Respondent's drain water went into
the Third Ward drain where it ran each year until 1969.
There were no objections by Appellants or any other
persons to Respondent's use of the drain in question
until 1969 when the drain was stopped by Appellent
'Vestover because of damage to the drain at its outlet
into the gorge of Bear River. (T. 93 and T. 94 Ins 1-14)
The only other damage to or noticeable erosion in the
drain occurred in 1959. (1"1. 111 and T. 124 Ins 12-25)
When the drain was blocked by Westover in the spring
of 1969, the Respondent's drain water passed into Bear
River b.v its old original channel down the borrow pit
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of the State Road. (T. 45 Ins 11-13) Water which ponded
on land of persons within the Respondent Drainage
District in 1969 did so because of the excessively wet
spring and not because Appellant \Vestover stopped
Respondent's access 'to the Third Ward Drain. (T. 32
Ins 24-28 and T. 34 Ins 28-30)
The Court made no finding in the amount of water
Respondent would be entitled to run down Appellants'
drain. (R. 28 and 29 and R. 53 through 57)

POINT I
RESPONDENT'S USE OF APPELLANTS' DRAINAGE DITCH WAS PERMISSIVE AND NOT ADVERSE AND RESPONDENT THEREFORE ACQUIRED NO RIGHTS IN SAID DITCH BY ITS USE
THEREOF.
It is clearly a requirement to procurement of an easement by prescription that the use relied upon be adverse.

In
n. 2, §457 of the Restatement of the Law of
Property, it is stated:
"An easement is rreated bv such use of land,
for the period of prescription: as would he privileged if an easement existed, provided the use
(a) adverse, and
the period of prescription, eontinnou:-:
(b)
and unmterrupted. ''
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The Respondent admits that the use relied upon to
obtain a prescriptive easement must be adverse but contends that where there has been an unmolested, open,
and continuous use of a way for twenty years or more
with the knowledge and acquiescence of the owner of
the servient estate, the use will be presumed to have
been adverse and under a claim of right. In support of
this contention, Respondent cited to the trial court
Thompson on Real Property and the Utah cases of
Richins v. Struhs, 412 P2d 533. (See Respondent's memorandum R. 33 through 38)
vVith these contentions of Respondent, Appellants
have no argument. However, they are not applicable
to the case at bar.
Powell on Real Property, in Volume 3, paragraph 413
at page 445, states the same principle, and then, at page
446, the author states that an exception to the principle:
''. . . exists when the established user by the
claimant is not exclusive, that is, does not rest
upon an independent foundation. If the claimant is only one of two, or several, or many who
make the user in question, it is per ha vs inf errable
that all of these uses are permissive. In such
case the claimant must affirmatively prove the
the adverse character of his behavior." (Emphasis added)
In support of this exception, Powell cites, among
others, the rtah case of Sdrales v. Rondos, (1949) 209
P2d ;)62. 'rhis case lays down ven· clearly the distinc-

s
tions applicable to the ease at bar. In the Sdrales case
Plaintiff and his predecessor had opened a right of
way for his own use. That right of way had also been
used by Defendant and his predecessor in interest since
at least 1899. The Defendant contended that this use
by him and his predecessors was presumptively adverse
and in support of this contention rited the case of Zollinger v. Frank, (175 P2d 714), relied upon by Respondent herein.
The Ftah Supreme Court with ,J ustiee \Volfe as ib
pen acknowledged tJ1e rnle of Zollinger v. Frank (Supra) and then, at page

;l();l,

statt>d:

''However, the facts in Zollinger v. Frank an•
entirely
from the facts in thP
present case. In the Zollinger case the servient
owner did not open the right of way for his own
use and he used only a portion of it infrequently.
Because of these facts we distinquished the Zollinger case from Harkness v. \Yoodmansee, 7
Utah 227, 26 P. 291, 293, wherein \Ve said, '\Yhere
a person opens a way for the use of 11is own prewises, and another person uses it also without
causing damage, the presumption is, in the ahsence of evidence to the contrary, that such use
by the latter was permissive, and not under a
claim of right.' This rule was rPaffirrned in
Jensen v. Gerrard, 85 l 'tah 481, 39 I> 2d 1070.
See the cases cited in suppo1·t of thP rnlP in 170
A.L.R.. 825.
"The facts of the instant <·asP hring· it within
the rule lairl down in Ha rkn
\'. \\' oo<lman ;.;e<'
since the defendant flop;.; not eo.n1f'nd tliat tlw

9

plaintiffs and their predecessors in title did not
use the alleyway for their own purposes.''
The rule thus articulated by Justice "Tolfe was affirmed in the Utah case of Buckley v. Cox (1952), 247 P.2d
277, wherein Justice McDonough, at page 279, stated:
''A presumption well established in this state
is that where a person opens a way for the use
of his own premises, and another person also
uses it without causing damage, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, such use by the latter
is permissive, and not under a claim of right.
Jensen v. Gerrard, supra.; Savage v. Nielsen,
114 Utah 22, 197 P.2d 117; Cache Valley Banking
Co. v. Cache County Poultry Growers Ass'n.,
Utah, 209 P.2d 251; Sdrales v. Rondos, Utah,
209 P.2d 562. It was defendant's burden to overcome this presumption and to establish his claim
by clear and convincing evidence.'' (Emphasis
added)
and rPaffinned in the rtah case of Lunt v. Kitchem;
(19f>3), 260 P.2d 535, where Justice McDonough, again
speaking for the Court, stated at page 538 as follows:
"Where a person opens the u·ay for 'ttse of his
own premises and another uses it without interfering with the landou·ner's use or caitsing him
da1na,qe, the presumption is that the use u:as perniissire and in abs('nce of proof to the contrary,
the person so using it does not acquire a right
of 1Niy by prescription .. , (Emphasis added)

The facts of the ease at bar bring it squarely within
the rule8 Sf't forth above. The evidence is uncontrovertP<l that tl1P way in question 1/'as opened by Appell-
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ants and their predecessors m interest for their ou:n
use at their oiun expense) and that the use of the way by
Respondent neither interferred u it71 nor caused damaqe
1

to the Appellants.

The Appellants and their associates owning propert>'
to the west constructed the drainage canal. I ts construction began at the west extremity of the drain and
proceeded east (T. 88). Each adjoining land owner in
turn requested extension of the drain to accommodate
his ground as the drain went eastward. Each adjoining
owner paid his proportionate share of the cost of extending the drain. The drain was constructed entirely
upon the ground of Appellants and their associates to
the west. No part of the drain is located on Respondent's
property (Pl. Ex. lfi and 16) Respondent contributed
nothing whatever to its cost or maintenance (1'. 91 and
92). Respondent's use of the drain eaused no damage
thereto. ( T. 139 Ins J -4)
The trial court in its

Deeision ( R. '.28

and 29) stated, after noting its agTeernent with the lmr
as laid down in the \Voodmansee (supra) case:
"However, further, the defendant:;: eonternl that
the evidence is uneontrnverted that the \\"HY in
question '''as opened hy defenclents for their .O\rn
use and at their expem;e aml that the use of tlie
way by plaintiff neither interferred witl1 nor
caused damage to the defendant. Tliis court holds
that there was daniaqeJ and testirnom· from tl}('
defendant and other witnesses of tl1p «1ef Pnclants
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1vlio are property owners who share in the use
of the drainage ditch and who initiated its construction was that there was damage by way of
erosion over the past years, especially on the
bottom end of the ditch where it goes over a
rather steep incline into the Bear River." (Emphasis added)
'This finding by the Court is wl1olly erroneous and cannot he substantiated hy any evidence in the record.
The Appellants called only three witnesses, Douglas
A. Bergeson, Ariel Iwomoto, and W. R. Westover, the
latter two being two of the Appellants. On direct examination, Bergeson tPstified as follows:

Q Dnring the rwriod of time that the drain has
been in use have property owners to the north
and to the east of Redion 12 also used the drain?

Q And liave yon at an.dime ever objected to
that use'!

Q Ir an· :·on evPr objected to the nse of the
drain b.\· propert:· owners to the north and the
,\

Xo,

r h<ffP

not.

Q Do :·ou know of any objection that has been
ma(h• h:· any member of the Third \Vard Drain-

age (\>111pan.'· to that n:-;e hy the property owners

12
to the east and to the north?
A

No, I don't.

Q Has there ever been a time to your knowledge when the use of the drain by property owners to the east or to the north was objected to?
A No, I don't. I don't know of any time when
they were objected to. (T. 93)
Ariel Iwamoto testified as follows on cross exammation by Respondent's Attorney:

Q And these people then ran it against your
will during all of that time, making your ditches
wider, and you never stopped them?
A Well, as long as use is use, it 1casn 't lrnrting
us. (Emphasis added)
139)

er.

W. R. Westover testified as follows:

Q Have you ever objected to the use of the
Third Ward Drainage Canal by any of the adjoining landowners who didn't participate in the
cost of
A

No.

(T. 141 Ins 20-2:1)

Any damage which Appellants may Jiaye suffered
to the canal was not suffered until HJ59. This subject
will be developed further under Point II of Ap0llanb •
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Argument. Suffice it to say here that the point made
is substantiated by the testimony of Mr. Bergeson recorded at page 124 of the Transcript, lines 11 to 24.
The Hespondent in this case has simply failed to
show by the required measure of clear and convincing
evidence (See Buckley v. Cox, supra.) that its use of
Appellants' right of way was adverse and have, accordingly, failed to overcome the presumption that its use
of said way was permissive.
rrhe record in this ('a,se writes a perfect script for

application of the rule set down by our Supreme Court
in Harknef's v. \Voodmansee, 26 P. 291. There the Court
said:
''Where a person opens a way for the use
of his own
and another uses it also
without causing damage, the presumption is,
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the
u.se by the latter u·a,1; permissire, and not under
a daini of riqht." (Emphasis added)
The Struhs case, argued at length by Respondent to
tl1e trial court, is clearly distinguishable under the rules'
set down in the Sdrales case. In the Struhs case the
preclPcPssors in intPrest of both Plaintiff and Defendant .f ointl.IJ constructed the right of way in question;
joi11fl.1J maintainPd the riµ:ht of way, and the right of
wa:" 'var-; JHirfl,11 on earh of f liPir propPrties. The Court
said that in ordPr for the USP to have been permissive,
one tl1ingwould have to have been shown vrns
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that the right of way was uiholly on Defendant's pro-

perty. The Court concluded that the rules set down in
the Zollinger case applied. The Zollinger case had already been distinguished by our Supreme Court.
Woodmansee has never been overruled. Indeed, it has
been distinguished from the rule of Struhs and Zollinger
and has been consistently applied by our Court. It
should be followed by the Court in the case at bar.
The contention of Respondent that the gradual erosion
in the drain ditch made the use adverse and therefore
sustained the burden of showing adverse use is implausible. In every case where there is use, there will be
some alteration of the premises used. That is to say,
in a case such as Sdrales, supra., the use by defendants
of the right of way for some 47 years undoubtedly
would have caused wearing and rutting of the roadway.
Such wearing and rutting does not satisfy the requirement of showing adverse use. The Idaho Supreme Court,
in the case of Simmons v. Perkins, lJS P.2d 740, made
it clear that:
"The use of a drivewav in common with the
owner and the general p"ublic, in the absence of
some decisive act on the user's part indicating
a separate and exclusive use on his part negatives
any presumption of individual n'qht therein in
his favor." (Emphasis added) ,
The Simmons case cites as one
for its holding the Utah case of Harkness v. \Yooillnam;pp, 26 P.

291, which case, Appellants submit, enunciates the rule
controlling in the case at bar. In addition, there is no
showing by Respondent that such erosion occured any
more from use of the ditch by Respondent than by
Appellants. Certainly such gradual erosion as may have
occurred was not a '' . . . decisive act on the user's
part indicating a separate and exclusive use on his
part . . . '' required by the rule of Simmons v. Perkins
(supra).
Vinally, there is no showing in the record that the
<lamage found by the Court to have occurred was
caused anymore by the Respondent's use .of the drain
than by the Appellants' use of the drain. Whether
Respondent's use of the drain was the cause of damage
over and above any cause precipitated by Appellants'
use thereof is wholly speculative and fails to meet this
Con rt 's standar<l of clear and convincing evidence.
POINT II
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT RESPONDENT'S
FSE OF APPELLANTS' DRAINAGE DITCH WAS
ADVERSE, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUBSri1ANTIATE THAT S"CCH USE BY RESPONDENT
WAS ADVERSE FOR THE FULL PRESCRIPTIVE
PJ<JRJOD OF T\VENTY YRARS.
In the Restatement of the Law of Real Property,
-1-;)7, H04, n. 2, it is stated:
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''An easement is created by such use of land,
for the period of prescription, as would be privileged if an easement existed, provided the use is
(a) adverse, and
(b) for the period of prescription, continuous
and uninterrupted.''
In Utah, the prescriptive period is twenty years.
(Cassity v. Castagna, 347 P.2d 834, 10 Ut. 2nd 16, and
Savage v. Nielsen, 197 P.2d 117, 114 Ut. 22)
The Utah Courts have long recognized the requirements of adverse and continous m;e for the prescriptive
period. In the case of Jensen v. Gerrard (39 P.2d 1070,
85 Ut. 481), the Court reiterated these requirements in
the following language :
''Before a right of way can be acquired by prescription, the use for the prescriptive period must
be. peaceable, continuous, open, adverse of
right ... " (Emphash; added)
Respondent has failed to show adverse use for the
prescriptive period. In fact, the only thing established
by the testimony of Respondent's own witnesses was
the fact of use, period. The only evidence elicited h»
Respondent on the adverse natul'e of such use was from
Appellants' witnesses. Indeed, it was from Appellants'
evidence that the Court concluded in its
Decision (R. 28129) that Respondent's use of the ditch
had caused damage and was therefore adversr. Assuming
this to he so, the period of adversr usP could not exceed
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the period dating from the first such damage and the
first such damage was in the year 1959.
Both Douglas A. Bergeson and Ariel I womoto, under
cross examination of Respondent's Attorney, testified
that there had been some natural, though not appreciable,
erosion on the drain from the beginning. Bergeson, however, when pressed on the point testified as follows:

Q So that even though you knew there was a bad
problem of erosion back here in '59, you never
did anything to the Cache Drainage Number Five
until you chopped the water off in
A

Not in '59. The erosion hadn't started.

Q I tliou9ht you testified it had started.
A No, when tl1e pipe was put in we did it because there showed some indications that the
grass may not hold up and it could break away,
so we put the pipe in, and at the outlet probably
was not finished as solid as it should be, and
the water coming down the pipe began an erosion
area there, and then that would begin to sluff
avrny until the pipe would begin to break off. I
think T can give .vou a-- ('r. 124 lns 11 to 25)
phasis added)
(See also the testimony of \V. R. \Vestover, T.
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. This testi.mony clearly establishes that the damages
found by the trial court to have occurred, occurred in
1959, some ten years prior to the blockage of the way
to Respondent by Appellant Westover. Hence, the period
of continuously adverse use of the drainage ditch by
Respondent is, at best, ten years and not the requisite
twenty years. Accordingly, Respondent failed to me<.'t
its burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence
that there had been continuous adverse use for twenty
years.

THE RESPONDENT IS NOT DEPENDENT ON
THE APPELLANTS' DRAINAGE DITCH TO
DRAIN ITS WATER BUT HAS A PRESENTLY EXISTING ADEQUATE MEANS OF DRAINING THE
LANDS WITHIN ITS BOUNDARIES.
The testimony elicited at the trial, from both Respondent's and Appellants' witnesses, establishes that therf'
has been for many years and now is a drain down the
borrow pit on the south side of the State Road adjoining the property of Appeilants on the north.
The Respondent's witness, Laraine Karren, testified:
Q And you say you refused that;
A Refused it heraus0 when onr water g-ot down
to where they wanted to tap it, it went ,inst a
hiking.

19

Q 1-'o the west 7
A

Yes.

Q Kept going down to the borrow pit 7
A

Went swell. Everybody could drain out.

Q There was no problem at all with that drainage then?
A

No. (T. 41 Ins 4 to 12)

After Appellant \Vestover stopped Respondent's use
of the drain in 1969, Respondent's drain water went
down said borrow pit to Bear River.

P. 0. Buttars, one of Respondent's witnesses, testified as follows :

Q Mr. Buttars, the water ran down the borrow
pit in the spring of 1969 to the river, didn't it,
the drain water?
A After they plugged that off so that there
was no place else to go, yes.

Q And have you ever had any elevation shots
run on the land out there to determine the relative elevation and fall of the watercourse from
the borrow pit west from your place down to the
Bear River'?

A I haven't had any, no.
Q T µ:ups::-; you didn't have to know that the
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water ran down it, did you?
A

That's the natural grade there. (T. 4G Ins

23-30 and T. 47 Ins 1-4)
Respondent's witness, Lloyd Elwood, testified as
follows:

Q In the year 1969 did the waste waters or the
runoff which went into the borrow pit proceed
west down to the Bear
·A

Yes, after it got so deep along in front of

Peterson's and Ern Morrison's and along
through there, it has to pond up so much before
it goes on, and then it will go on west to the river.

Q And that ponding is in the borrow pit?
A Yes. (T. 76lns14-22)
These excerpts from the Respondent's evidence show
that Respondent will not be damaged in any way by
closure to it of Appellants' drainage ditch. Rather than
allow Respondent a right it has neither established or
needs, the Court should terminate Respondent's rights
in Appellants' _ditch and require Respondent to either
(1) acqltire an interest in Appellants' drain by proper
condemnation proceedings which would give Appellants
compensation for the burden thus imposed, or (2) use
its historic drain along the borrow pit of the State
Road directly west to accomplish its

21
POINT IV
THI£

JUDGMENT

OF

THE

TRIAL

COURT

SHOULD BE REVERSED FOR FAILURE TO DETERMINE A LIMITATION ON THE AMOUNT OF
WATER WHICH CAN BE RUN BY RESPONDENT
THROUGH APPELLANTS' DRAIN.
Under the judgment of the trial court, the Respondent has an open end right to use Appellants' drain
ditch. Respondent could, if it elected so to do, develop
additional unlimited amounts of drain water and send
it down upon Appellants, imposing upon Appellants
the obligation, without a corresponding right of compensation, of caring for the same.
Assuming arguendo the validity of the trial courts
finding of a right of way in Respondent, in order to
adjudicate a valid right in Respondent, the Court should
have fixed and determined the exact limitation on that
right which it failed to do. Appellants submit that this
failure is fatal to the judgment entered by the trial
court.

CONCLPSION
For the rt>m;ons eited, the judgment of the trial
court should lw reversed and this Court should adjudge
tht> Respondent's claim to a right in Appellants' draining ditrl1 without hasis in fact or Jaw and null and void
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and Appellants respectfully pray for judgment accordingly.
Respectfully submitted,
OLSON, HOGGAN & SORENSON
L, Brent Hoggan
56 West Center
Log·an, l. talt
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants

